Khatam Al-Nabieen University

Owner and Head of Khatam al-Nabieen University :
Mohammad Jawad Mohseni (20260920)
One of the university’s shareholders:
Qayum Sajjadi (20260920)
University lecturer:
Sardar Mohammad Rahimi (20260920)

Mohseni has rejected allegations cited by the Taliban in canceling the private university’s operating license last week, saying authorities have provided no evidence to support the accusations. A dispute over ownership of the land should be treated separately from the university’s license to operate.

Before the Taliban canceled its license, nearly 4,000 students were enrolled in undergraduate and master’s programs at its main campus in Kabul and its campus in Ghazni.

Khatam Al-Nabieen University shutdown is probably not simply an administrative decision about university standards. The recent reporting points to a much broader confrontation between the Taliban authorities and a prominent Shia/Hazara institutional network in Kabul.

Khatam Al-Nabieen University

On 16 September 2026, the Taliban Ministry of Higher Education confirmed that it had revoked the operating licenceof Khatam Al-Nabieen University in Kabul and its Ghazni branch. The ministry says the university violated ministry policies and conducted activities it regarded as inconsistent with educational objectives, but it has not publicly specified the alleged violations. Students have reportedly been told to transfer to other universities. 

There is, however, important additional context.

1. Khatam Al-Nabieen is more than a university

The university is part of a larger complex associated with the late Shia cleric Mohammad Asif Mohseni, one of Afghanistan's most prominent Shia religious and political figures.

The wider Khatam Al-Nabieen complex includes:

• Khatam Al-Nabieen University
• Khatam Al-Nabieen religious seminary
• Tamadon TV
• associated religious, educational and cultural activities.

Mohseni established the seminary in 2007. The institutions subsequently became associated with his family and with the political/religious network around the Harakat-e-Islami movement. 

That history is extremely important for understanding the current action.

2. The Taliban's stated justification has two parts

There are essentially two official lines of argument.

Political: The Taliban says institutions connected with political parties cannot continue operating because the Islamic Emirate has abolished political parties. Taliban authorities have specifically described the Khatam institutions as being associated with the dissolved Islamic Movement/Harakat-e-Islami. 

Property: The Ministry of Justice claims that the land on which the Khatam institutions stand was state land that had been unlawfully seized. It therefore says the property should be returned to state control. Khatam officials dispute this and say they possess documentation proving their legal rights to the property; they have also argued that the property dispute has not received a final judicial ruling. 

So the Taliban's formal explanation is not simply "this is a Shia university and we are closing it." It is framed as a combination of abolition of political-party structures + recovery of allegedly state-owned land + regulatory violations.

3. But the timing makes the religious dimension difficult to ignore

This is where the story becomes considerably more significant.

On 5 September 2026, Taliban forces surrounded the Khatam Al-Nabieen seminary in western Kabul and ordered its evacuation. Protests followed. Reports said teachers and students were detained; one account put the number detained at 28, although the precise number and circumstances have varied between reports. 

The university had reportedly already been placed under Taliban control, with authorities appointing a new president and four deputies. 

And the sequence did not stop there.

On 8 September 2026, Taliban forces reportedly surrounded the office of Afghanistan's High Shia Council in Kabul. The reason was not publicly explained. 

That makes the university closure look less like an isolated education-policy decision and more like part of a larger campaign to bring independent Shia institutional structures under Taliban control.

4. There is a particularly important distinction

The Taliban is not eliminating Shia Islam as such. Shia Afghans continue to live and worship in Afghanistan, and the Taliban has repeatedly sought arrangements with sections of the Shia community.

The more sensitive issue is independent Shia institutional power.

Khatam Al-Nabieen represented an unusually substantial combination of:

religious education + university education + media + clerical networks + Hazara/Shia social influence + historical political connections.

That is a very different proposition from an ordinary Shia mosque.

The Taliban's actions appear aimed at bringing this type of autonomous institutional network under central state/Islamic Emirate control.

5. The Tamadon TV case is a useful precedent

The same authorities had already targeted Tamadon TV, which was associated with the Khatam network.

In 2024, the Taliban Ministry of Justice said Tamadon had to stop operating because of its association with a political party and because it was allegedly operating on government land that had been illegally acquired. The same argument was applied to Khatam Al-Nabieen's university and seminary. 

So today's university closure is not a completely new dispute. It appears to be the latest stage of a conflict that has been developing for at least two years.

Summary:

The important story is therefore not simply "Taliban closes a university."

It is better understood as:

Khatam Al-Nabieen → control of Shia education → control of Shia property → suppression of politically connected independent institutions → pressure on wider Shia organizational structures.

The simultaneous pressure on the seminary, university, Tamadon TV and potentially Shia representative structuresmakes this a significant development for the future relationship between the Taliban government and Afghanistan's Shia/Hazara community.