Background and Names:
On February 28, 2025, a suicide bomber detonated his explosives in the Jami-e-Haqqania Madrassa in Akora Khattak, Nowshera, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Pakistan. The explosion took place shortly after the principal of the seminary and leader of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Sami (JUI-S), Hamidul Haq, left the mosque to move towards his home, as the bomber came close to him, according to some eyewitnesses, shook hands with him. The still unidentified suicide attacker managed to kill six people on the spot and injured 12 more, including three policemen protecting Hamidul Haq, who also later succumbed to injuries. While no group has yet claimed the attack, the primary suspect is the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).

ISKP since its inception in late 2014, has had history of confrontation with the Taliban movement and its Deobandi belief system and even a longer history of targeting JUI, which it considers to be the epitome of Deoband’s political face fueling the Taliban’s political system encapsulated in the form of the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan. The Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam’s faction led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman has been consistently targeted. The group has claimed several assassinations targeting JUI-F members, mostly in Bajaur tribal district, culminating with a deadly suicide attack in August 2023 against a JUI- gathering. However, the hatred for JUI-F is just a piece of a larger puzzle that encompasses all religious movements affiliated with Deobandi current of Islam, and, ultimately, with Sufism. Thus, the war that ISKP has started against the Deobandi movement includes JUI-Sami-ul Haq as well and by default ISKP has referenced several of its publications against the Jami-e-Haqqania in Akora Khattak.
 

It is important to note the Islamic State has been consolidating its history by connecting its targets to interpretations based on earlier Islam. Most of its publications have been in Pashto, then translated into Urdu, Uzbeki, and Tajiki. Most recently, the group's Pakistan branch began its publication of their belief system in Barohi, a language spoken in Balochistan. When it comes to religious sects in Pakistan, ISKP links all of them to secondary accusations of Territorialism, Tribal Nationalism and Sufism – the core accusation against them – except for the Jamat-e-Ahle Hadees, which are labelled as traitors. Thus, Deobandis, Barelvis, Sufi’s, and Shias are accused of indulging in non-Islamic practices; at the same time, the Taliban are considered the most powerful group which adopted the Sufi ideology in the region. However, the primary accusation revolves on the basis of interpretation of political ideologies extrapolated from belief systems of the Deoband school of Thought challenged by the Islamic State’s proto-Salafist school of thought. 
 

ISKP has produced numerous treaties on the Deoband school in the last decade, and with more bellicosity recently. For instance, ISKP has published a series of 6 articles that appeared in different issues of its Pashto language magazine, Khorasan Ghag. The series was also featured and referred to in other magazines of ISKP, such as the Arabic version, Sawt Khurasan. The series articulates the religious creed and methodology of Deobandis as interpreted by ISKP, connecting them to the Afghan Taliban and religious scholars in Pakistan. The same narratives were written exemplified in perhaps the two main documents produced by ISKP on the topic of Deobandis. The first one, published in late December 2022 by the unofficial but prominent ISKP media institute Mubarezeen Media, is a direct attack on the Deobandi school of thought. Throughout the book, the writer, Mufti Kheiruddin Hanafi, dissects all Islamic movements in Central Asia and in the Subcontinent that claim to follow the teachings of Imam Abu Hanifa. However, according to ISKP takfeeri ideology, these movements are considered to have misinterpreted his words.

The second book was published in the aftermath of the ISKP attack in Khar, Bajaur tribal district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The pamphlet is an extensive critique of post-Partition politics of Pakistan’s religious parties, such as Markaz Jamiat Ahle Hadees and JUI-F. It then makes a comparison with the JUI-F’s development as a political party in four-distinct phases with rhetorical evidence from books, magazines and newspapers since 1947. In this book, JUI-S’ split from JUI-F is also mentioned, referring to Samiul Haq. Particularly, the book argues that while Fazlur Rehman and Samiul Haq divided the party, they still supported the Pakistani state and, specifically, Musharraf’s regime. 
 

This was not the first time, however, that ISKP mentioned JUI-S. Already in the second half of 2021, ISKP published its main book dissecting the Afghan Taliban’s government as interpreted by ISKP. In the book, the author, Abu Saad Muhammad Khorasani, mentions that the Afghan Taliban have fully adopted Sufi practices as framed by several groups in the Subcontinent, including the “Muftis of Akora Khattak”, who are “influencing” the religion of Islam in Afghanistan.