Afghan Biographies

Khost Province and tribal setup


Name Khost Province and tribal setup
Ethnic backgr.
Date of birth
Function/Grade Background and Names
History and Biodata

Khost reflects a unique tribal makeup in comparison to other areas of the nation. The province has a far higher number of individual tribes—17—compared to its neighbors (reportedly, Paktya has four and Paktyka five) and most of the country as well (except for Ghazni). Khost reportedly has the second-highest population of the nomadic pastoralist Kuchi tribes throughout Afghanistan, illustrating how prevalent the traditional clan systems are in the province. And perhaps more important, none of Khost’s tribes, except for a relatively small group (the Ahmadzai Kuchis), are affiliated with the country’s two large Pashtun confederations—the Durrani and Ghilzai. The relative isolation resulting from the existence of these smaller tribal groupings has created a sense of independence for Khostis, which symbiotically has reinforced their ideas on governance.

For example, in return for supporting the installation of King Mohammed Nadir Khan in 1929, the local tribes around Khost didn’t ask for cabinet positions or infrastructure projects. Instead, they extracted from the central government exemptions from taxes, military service, and compulsory education. For these tribes “less equaled more,” and their goal was to be left alone from state apparatus—an idea that undoubtedly resonates with many Khostis today. As part of this agreement, they also maintained a special administrative tribal status that continued until the communists came to power in 1978. Despite the radical societal transformations the DRA rolled out, strong tribal identities remained. And during the Taliban rule of 1995–2001, Khost, Paktyka, and Paktya were ruled by their own local governors instead of the Kandahari Taliban who held power over the rest of the country. Due to these special historical conditions, Khost and its two neighboring provinces are today part of the “only area in Afghanistan where the tribes . . . remain to varying degrees the main recipients of power alongside the state.”

In retaining a significant level of autonomy, Khost tribal psyche holds what might be termed a “kingmaker” complex, a residual consequence of having helped to overthrow King Amanullah. In many ways, the relationship with the central government is a function of the Pashtun tribal code that continues to be predominant in Khost. One component of the Pashtunwali code is the concept of seyal (equality), which ensures that no single person becomes too powerful in the tribe, especially when power occurs at the expense of others. This ideal has worked its way on a larger political scale in the fact that tribes from Khost have periodically rebelled against governments when they think they are overstepping their authority or not demonstrating enough respect toward them.

The Mangal tribe, located in Khost’s Musa Kheyl, Sebari, and Qalandar Districts, provides an example of the concept of seyal on a broader scale. Historically, the Mangal have maintained a pattern of rebellion against local governors, appointees of the central government, and outsiders in general, which continues to this day. When the first reported Westerners came to Khost in 1879—a British army unit that was part of the invasion force during the Second Anglo-Afghan War—they found their most troublesome opponent was the Mangal tribe, who assembled an 8,000-man force to attack the British. After defeating the fleeing Mangals, British troops carried out the “Massacre in Khost,” the retributive plundering and burning of 11 villages that was later investigated by Parliament. But the Mangals eventually returned, ousting the British-installed governor. The foreign forces then had to destroy ammunition stockpiles and evacuate the area, squashing dreams of incorporating Khost into the Raj

The Mangals themselves revolted against the Kabul government (itself seen as a foreign power in a way) several times during the modern formation of the Afghan state. The Mangals failed during a major uprising in 1912 but were nearly victorious in the Khost Rebellion of 1924. The tribe participated heavily in the 1929 overthrow of King Amanullah and then staged the Mangal Revolt in 1959, which occurred when the government went to build a road from Chamkani to Musa Kheyl and a tribal leader named Charka Baja (meaning “Dirty Water”) declared war. Outnumbered by mechanized government troops and by progovernment tribes such as the Jaji and Tani, who were brought in to work on the road, Charka Baja and many Mangals fled in exile to Pakistan. Almost like clockwork, 20 years later the Mangals were at it again—this time revolting against the new communist government.

Similarly, the Zadran tribe, part of a larger “Zadran Arc” in the two neighboring provinces, is present in Khost’s Shamal, Nadir Sha Khot, and Spera Districts and has held an essentially antigovernment role over the course of history. ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­Like its Mangal compatriots, the Zadran tribe played a significant part in supporting the 1924 Khost Rebellion and the overthrow of Amanullah five years later. Later, the Zadrans revolted against the DRA in 1979 and blocked the Sitta Kandow Pass, which was the primary route connecting Khost to the rest of Afghanistan. Despite President Hafizullah Amin’s attempts to defeat the Zadrans that year, the government experienced “a crushing defeat” with “hundreds of burnt-out cars and armored vehicles” littering the road from Paktya to Khost.

While there were representatives from many Khosti tribes involved in opposing the Soviets and the DRA, the mujahedeen derived most of its support from the two tribes discussed above, the Zadran and the Mangal. From the two kinship groups, Jalaluddin Haqqani of the Zadrans was the most prominent mujahedeen leader to come out of the area. Haqqani grew up in Paktya but lived in Khost’s Mandozai District after the overthrow of the DRA and solidified his support base throughout the province, which persists today even after his death.

Conversely, while the Zadrans and Mangals have a history of opposition to Kabul and its representatives, certain tribes such as the Tanis and Jajis have historically been progovernment (or perhaps better defined as less opposed than others). For example, when the government of King Zahir Shah (1933–1973) formed qawm-e kandak (tribal battalions) to provide security to the border regions of the province, the Tani tribe provided hundreds of men for these units. This policy continued under the DRA government, when the Tani agreed to the overtures of tribal affairs minister Faiz Mohammed to supply the government with militiamen. The Tanis’ relatively educated neighbors, the Jaji tribe, also supported the DRA, and many joined the government’s security forces during the late 1970s and 1980s. This pattern continued during the last two decades, with the Jaji tribe being “unambiguously supportive of GIRoA” and touted as having “always flown the government flag.” In context, it might be reasoned that Tani and Jaji tribal support in the end might not derive from a full allegiance to the central state but rather as an offset to the larger and stronger tribes in Khost Province.

As illustrated above, tribal allegiances to the government in Kabul are essentially standard over time, and those relationships often determined the success of either side during the 1970s–80s war between the communist government and the mujahedeen. A noteworthy example of this relationship between tribes and the central state is the case of DRA president Mohammad Najibullah. Ruling Afghanistan from 1987 to 1992, Najibullah originally hailed from Seyyed Karam District in Paktya. During his early days, he spent time in Khost discussing politics with friends, and he knew the area intimately, facilitating his subsequent “skillful manipulation of tribal divisions among the Mujahidin [that] helped keep the isolated Khost outpost on the Pakistani border in the regime column.”

Likewise, the defense minister for most of the 1980s and one of the most influential members of the DRA cabinet also hailed from Khost. Shahnawaz Tanai, from the Tani tribe, used his “tribal connections in the province to throw back Haqqani offensives,” including rallying his own clan to defeat a mujahedeen takeover of their namesake district in December 1986. In the end, it was Haqqani’s utilization of those same connections and the abandonment of the DRA by the tribal militias that led to the government’s defeat. Ultimately, it might be viewed that, in the absence of support from the Soviets, the national government could no longer assist their local Khost supporters, and consequently the more powerful local tribes, the Zadrans and the Mangals, were able to defeat their weaker progovernment adversaries, the Tanis and the Jajis.

 

Last Modified 2022-10-23
Established 2022-10-23