|History and Biodata
Head Quetta Shura:
Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour
Mawlawi Baryal (killed in Kunduz afghan Airattack 201804002)
A key member of Taliban’s Quetta Council Mullah Sherin Mullah Shirin had hatched and executed the Oct 18, 2018 assassination plan of Kandahar Police Chief Gen. Abdul Raziq. The attacker was trained in Al Hamza training center where suicide bombers are being trained under the supervision of Taj Mir who is also famous as Mawlavi Zabiullah. Taj Mir has close links with the Haqqani terrorist network and the military intelligence of Pakistan. Mullah Sherin hatched the assassination plan in close coordination with ISI and cooperation of one of the security guards of Kandahar governor who had helped in the appointment of the attacker as the security guard of the governor. The governor’s guard who helped in the execution of the plan has managed to flee the Kandahar city. Mullah Sherin has close links with the Haqqani network’s Sirajuddin Haqqani, currently operates as Taliban’s intelligence chief and is based in Quetta city.(20181023)
Taliban leaders decided Dec 2018 at a meeting in Quetta that since then, the fighters of that group should not seize the cities of Afghanistan, instead increase their suicide attacks to show their existence.
The Quetta Shura is a militant organization which is composed of the leaders of the Afghan Taliban, and believed to be based, since about 2001, within the city of Quetta in the Balochistan province of Pakistan. The Shura was formed at a time after the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was toppled as part of events occurring during late 2001, the senior leadership at the time, including Mullah Mohammed Omar, proceeding to escape into Pakistan. In February 2010, several of the key members of the Quetta Shura, who were dispersed within a variety of cities and towns of Pakistan, were detained by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Pakistan proceeded to agree to repatriate these individuals to Afghanistan, if they were found to have not committed crimes within the boundaries of the Pakistani nation.
A disproportionally high number of Ishaqzai, Noorzai and Alizai tribesmen compose the Taliban fighting force and Shura membership, mostly because these tribes have been largely deprived of senior government positions. Friendship networks, or andiwali (Pashto for camaraderie), often play an important role in attracting recruits, maintaining group solidarity and contributing to the authority of some Taliban figures.
The Taliban leaders raise money from wealthy Persian gulf donors and direct operations in south Afghanistan. According to Lt. Gen. David Barno, the retired former commander of American forces in Afghanistan "The Quetta Shura is extremely important, they are the intellectual and ideological underpinnings of the Taliban insurgency."
American officials believe that the Quetta Shura gets support from parts of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as some of its senior officials believe that leaders such as Mullah Omar would be valuable assets if the Taliban were to regain power after a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. According to Abdul Rahim Mandokhel, a Pakistani senator from Zhob in northern Balochistan. "The whole war in Afghanistan is being launched from here," he said. He accused Pakistan's intelligence agencies of carrying out a "double" policy. "One thing is clear: the area is being used for cross-border offences," he said.
A report by the London School of Economics (LSE) claimed to provide the most concrete evidence yet that the ISI is providing funding, training and sanctuary to the Taliban insurgency on a scale much larger than previously thought. The report's author Matt Waldman spoke to nine Taliban field commanders in Afghanistan and concluded that Pakistan's relationship with the insurgents ran far deeper than previously realised. Some of those interviewed suggested that the organization even attended meetings of the Taliban's supreme council, the Quetta Shura. A spokesman for the Pakistani military dismissed the report, describing it as "malicious".
The Taliban are unlikely to remain Islamabad’s proxies if they recapture the Afghan government. It is also improbable that the Taliban will formally recognize the 19th century Durand Line as the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. No government of Afghanistan has ever recognized the Durand Line as an international border. For now, the Taliban’s sanctuary in Pakistan enables the movement to foment violence Afghanistan, keeping the movement subservient to Islamabad.
Assassination of several senior Taliban figures in Quetta could potentially drive the Taliban further away from their Pakistani sponsors. The Taliban have acknowledged that Afghan clerics Mawlawi Abdul Salam and Maulana Abdullah Zakiri were senior ideologues. They were killed in Quetta in December and January, respectively. Maulana Abdullah Zakiri’s funeral in Quetta on December 31, 2013 attracted 10,000 people and was addressed by prominent Afghan and Pakistani clerics.
On Jan 07, 2016 rumors in Pakistan came up with reports about a reshuffle among the Taleban Leadership Council, also known as the Quetta Shura, which was said to have included the sacking of two senior long-time members of the council, Mullah Abdul Razzaq and Mullah Hassan Rahmani. The two, a former Taleban interior minister and former governor of Kandahar respectively, had reportedly refused to swear allegiance to Mansur and had participated in conversations between the Taleban leadership and the Afghan government, both in China in late 2014 and in Murree (Pakistan) in July 2015. According to the same rumor, Mullah Omar’s son Mullah Muhammad Yaqub was promoted to the Taleban’s Political Commission. Additionally, and according to this rumor, a Tajik (Sheikh Sharif), an Uzbek (Mawlawi Abdul Rahman) and a Turkmen (no name given), were made members of the council in an apparent attempt to increase high-level representation of non-Pashtun ethnic groups. Sharif and Rahman are both said to be ulema. The inclusion of a few ethnic minority representatives is a symbolic acknowledgment of non-Pashtun fighters’ increasing importance in Afghanistan’s northern provinces. However this will not alter the dominance of the Taleban movement’s ‘Kandahari’ core. (20160212)
According to reports, Sirajuddin Haqqani, Mullah Haibat Akhundzada, Mullah Qayoum, Mullah Abdul Qayoum Zakir and Mullah Shirin, Mullah Omer's brother Mullah Abdul Manan are possible forerunners to succeed Mansour.(20160522)
According to the reports, Abdul Qayoum Zakir, Taliban's military head; Mullah Habibullah, a member of Taliban Quetta Shura; and Sayed Tayib Agha, head of Taliban's political office in Qatar are among the senior Taliban members that are opposed to the appointment of Mansour – who was Mullah Omar's deputy.(20050802)